US-China relations in perspective : a discussion with Dr. Kerry Brown
To understand the ins and outs of a bilateral relationship with multiple antagonisms, Dr. Kerry Brown gives an interview to Marino Koutsiouris and Thomas Gareau-Paquette for the CAIUM Review.
This interview was originally published in French in the CAIUM Review.
« We are still on the brink of a new Cold War » Henry Kissinger said in November 2019 at Bloomberg’s New Economy Forum in Beijing. At a time when the United States is preparing to choose its Commander-in-Chief, what value should be given to the omen of Richard Nixon’s former Secretary of State?
Kerry Brown is a Professor of Chinese Studies and Director of the Lau China Institute at King’s College, London. Author of « The World according to Xi » and « China’s World : What does China want ? » among others, he was a Research Fellow and Head of the Asia program at Chatham House and served as First Secretary of the British embassy in Beijing from 1998 to 2005. We met for an MS Teams discussion between London, Paris and Montreal to try and grasp the paradoxes underlying Sino-American relations.
T.G-P : How would you assess the general impact of 4 years of Trump on China’s relationship with the United States and the world ?
K.B. : It would be an understatement to say that the U.S. President has made the tone between China and the United States difficult, and I think that’s partly due to Donald Trump’s transactional view of diplomacy. His desire to rebalance the U.S. trade balance at all costs is part of that logic, despite the fact that economists do not seem to agree on the benefits of such policies. So the President has taken this line, and I think that until the beginning of this year, it was not necessarily wrong to say that U.S.-China relations needed some kind of “rebalancing”. But I think Covid-19 has clearly had a real impact, making the relationship between the two countries truly critical. And if Trump, as the election approaches, feels that he might lose, then the situation is likely to deteriorate further. It’s a huge problem, and to make things more complex, we’re talking about a country that has completely opposite political, intellectual and cultural values from those of Washington. This makes the outcome all the more uncertain.
M.K : How do you think US-China relations would differ under a second Trump presidency and a Biden presidency? Many say that Joe Biden could take a more “conventional” approach to diplomacy than Donald Trump. But while this may be true, it doesn’t mean that we can rule out the possibility of an enduring rivalry between the two countries in the long run, is that right ?
K.B. : The rivalry is a fact, it will not disappear. The only variable now is its intensity. But the main problem with Trump is that he doesn’t work with other countries. It’s terrible, and I think Joe Biden would probably cooperate more with the international community and be more open to multilateralism when dealing with China. This turnaround is necessary because leaders in Europe, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada seem a little lost and distraught. There are some areas where we are still more or less working together, but since Trump, it has become extremely difficult. In this situation, I think a Biden presidency, from a multilateralist perspective, would probably be more effective towards China. But the objective will remain the same: to try to contain and control China. Biden might try to do it in a way that preserves our interests a little more, but we have to recognize that China will be very difficult to contain or control in certain areas. Also, another thing that I think Biden will do if elected will be to better manage and delegate the American diplomatic apparatus. At the moment, Trump has a very poor State Department, especially in terms of the people who deal with key issues, starting with the relation with China. I think that Biden would be more effective and more demanding of competence at that level.
M.K : Do you think there is a more “appealing” candidate in the eyes of Beijing ? Are there factional debates within the CCP over who would be best for China in a way ? Some recently argued in Foreign Policy that many amongst CCP elites would rather prefer to deal with 4 more years of unpredictable but relatively simple and very transactional Trump diplomacy than with a more technical, multilateral and we could add, ideological Biden diplomacy…
K.B. : Well, I think the Chinese leadership is very structural and pragmatic in its dealings with the United States. After all, in a situation where the relationship itself is a problem, who is in charge doesn’t really matter, does it? But I know the article you’re talking about and in a way, one could understand why a second term of Trump would suit China. Four more years of a dysfunctional America that trashes its reputation and improves China’s image could be an attractive scenario for some ; as opposed to a Biden presidency which, if orderly and well conducted, could perhaps, at least in part, restore something of America’s image.
And while much damage has been done, I think a new president might be able to reverse some of it, at least in part. But no matter what happens, even if Trump is not re-elected, it is clear that today, something like 40% of the American electorate is more likely to support someone who behaves like Trump. And these people won’t simply disappear if Biden is elected. You know, China is clearly aware that a growing number of Americans have a very negative opinion of them, but their ideals and illusions about America’s grandeur have disappeared. There is no longer this exaltation towards American soft power as there once was, and young people are less inclined to go to study in the United States. They feel stronger and become more and more nationalistic in the face of a United States that is perceived as a declining power… And while this vision might be wrong, it still remains their perception, and a victory for Joe Biden will not change that.
M.K.: This is, indeed, very worrying. And this dynamic was particularly visible during that horrendous first presidential debate from a couple weeks ago… Did you watch it ?
K.B. : Obviously, no… But while China might be able to live with another four years of Trump, we should not jump to conclusions. I don’t think Chinese leaders see any advantage in the world’s leading economic and military power being having a nervous breakdown. This is not good for anyone. And the all-too-common idea that the Chinese would want America to collapse is wrong. In the end, I think they are looking for an America that continues to do the things it does in certain areas — those that China is not interested in — but also, and above all, a stable and predictable America. They find it as bad as we do… America is having a nervous breakdown and that’s not good for anyone.
T.G-P : Have the US and China reached some kind of point of no return ? Can the US and the West and China really permit themselves to compete so fiercely in many areas while at the same time, cooperating on global challenges such as climate change, world peace or poverty reduction ? Isn’t that antithetical ? The precedent of non-cooperation set by the pandemic is quite concerning.
K.B. : There is no point of no return. I believe that working together on climate change, on global health issues, economic growth, all areas where technical cooperation is needed, is crucial. Working on these issues, in Europe, America, Australia and elsewhere, is paramount. However, everyone needs to look at the current state of the world economy and realize how catastrophic the situation is. This disaster is unfolding before our eyes, in a world where Beijing represents one fifth of the world economy. And if, as all indicators predict, the strong growth characteristic of contemporary China soon resumes, then this cooperation becomes inevitable. Take the example of climate change: if China is not part of the solution, then nothing will happen. Same scenario for the Covid-19 vaccine, or any other public health issue. Needless to say, however, there are some areas that are impervious to this need. In terms of governance and values, collaboration between these two Nemesis will, in some contexts, unfortunately prove impossible.
Now, in terms of technological cooperation as well, I think that China has become very strong in some areas. I mean, look at their efforts in terms of artificial intelligence, their innovations in renewable energy technology, or even on high-speed trains. They’re obviously very good in those areas, but the context makes cooperation paradoxically complicated. The Chinese are still weak in other areas, but it is very difficult to stop a power when it invests so much in research and development. Trump’s trade war may have slowed them down, but ultimately, the US is only buying time.
M.K : It is rather obvious that China’s economic success and modernisation does not conform to our Western view of what modernisation should look like. In this situation, what should a modus vivendi be for us, Western liberal democracies, in the face of an authoritarian and undemocratic China? Do we have no choice but to let China be China? Are we willing to accept that ?
K.B. : It’s not like we haven’t tried to change China… That’s what we’ve been trying to do for 40 years. For hundreds of years, even. I’m writing a new book right now and I’ve been looking at writings by Montesquieu and Voltaire mentioning China. In the course of my research, I couldn’t help but think, “When did we Europeans, Americans or Canadians stop dreaming of transforming China? ». What have we learned in 300 years? We’ve always been wrong [about China]. Why not simply agree that it is not for us to decide what China can and cannot become? All we can do today is recognize our differences and determine what that means for us. As I said, we can still work together in some areas where we have commonalities such as climate change, public health or economic growth, and much less in other areas. We simply do not share the same paradigms when it comes to multilateralism. Of course, we must be wary of some of China’s actions in our respective countries, but we cannot change the way China wants to manage its internal affairs. It simply won’t work.
I could tell you how much I think Canada doesn’t need the Queen of England as its head of state and give you all sorts of great ideas on how to run your country, but you’d probably say that’s none of my business, right ? And you could tell me how the United Kingdom doesn’t need Boris Johnson as Prime Minister, and I would very much agree with you, but again, what can you do? We should have the same philosophy towards China. Why are we so keen to tell China how to run its internal affairs?
M.K : But questions about confronting models aside, shouldn’t China make an effort to reduce its unfair trade practices ? Guarantee IP protection, review its state-subsidy support to national companies, etc ? Solving this issue could perhaps help China and the West get back on the track of peace more effectively. But is China willing to do that ?
K.B. : I think China’s ready to do that. And this is gradually becoming a reality in areas such as finance, for example. China has recently opened up its financial sector and liberalized the rules on foreign ownership of Chinese companies, as a recent article in The Economist explains very well. This shows that in areas where China sees an advantage for itself, it opens up. Now, when it comes to unfair trade practices per se, there’s still a lot of work to be done. But we need to be good negotiators, work collectively [with our allies] and do our best to get what we want in our trading relationship with China. And frankly, with all the economic problems that the world is going through right now, I think China is probably going to liberalize even more in many areas. That’s just pragmatism and it’s a fight worth fighting for. But the idea of the American alt-right that we should strive to change China ideologically, is a waste of time in my view. We should focus our efforts on a pragmatic dialogue with China on trade and equal access to our respective markets.
T.G-P : Let’s talk about tech. What are the roots of the current mistrust between the United States and China over Chinese 5G technology ? How can we understand the concerns and doubts of the West (especially the United States) about Huawei and the possible risk of surveillance on their populations?
K.B. : On this matter, we can divide the issue in two since Huawei is considered as a commercial threat and a security threat. A commercial threat because it’s been a very successful company, and although this is not the stated reason by the United States, it’s obvious that the security issue is used by the United States to get rid of a potential commercial rival. The emergence of China as a significant technological power is, I think, already underway. And the United States does not have such a technologically versatile company at the international level when it comes to 5G, which is something that they know is very problematic. So I would say that the trade issue is an indispensable factor in understanding the situation, despite not the most important one.
The security threat, on the other hand, is more difficult to grasp. Huawei executives have stated that they are not involved in any form of espionage, which is by definition impossible to prove. And when it is proven, it’s…already too late. Thus, it can be said that Huawei is now perceived as a security actor, but perhaps not in the conventional sense of the term. The problem ultimately lies in its tacit subordination to Beijing: if the Chinese government asked it to provide certain users data, Huawei would not be in a situation where answering “no” would be an option. So the perception of that in the West is a very strong one. And I think that’s why it’s a problematic company. The fuss is not about the company itself but rather about where it’s from.
T.G-P : Would your answer be similar concerning the prohibition of certain ByteDance applications such as Tiktok ? Since this decision was mainly made by the Trump administration, from what has been said in the media, do you think these kinds of restrictions will remain in place if Biden wins the presidency ?
K.B. : Above all, this is mostly symbolic. While this might be some kind of high impact thing for Trump, I can’t really see what it achieves. The argument was always, « we don’t need to fear the Chinese because we have great values » and « we have a great model of governance which can deal with this », but now I do not know where this is going. When I dealt with this sort of issue 10 years ago, 12 years ago, you know, the argument was that we don’t need to fear Chinese investment because our rule of law is so strong and our sense of values is so strong that we can deal with it. That as long as these would conform to the law, we would not have to worry. And now suddenly, everyone is very terrified because of this perception that China is somehow influencing us. But I don’t know what this influence is, and I frankly can’t see it… I mean, I’ve been working on China for 25 years now and I frequently deal with colleagues there. What, now ? Does that mean that I become a believer in Marxism-leninism with Chinese characteristics ? Of course not ! I mean, maybe I am inoculated, but what is weird about trying to ban TikTok or WeChat is that they are symptomatic of some kind of panic and a loss of confidence which will hardly go away. That’s my answer. I don’t know about the technology side of the TikTok and Huawei ban, but it seems to me that in this case, banning those apps is a result of panicking and thinking that you cannot deal with the problem. I can’t see how you’re going to get that back unless enough people say « well actually, we do believe in our systems rule of law governance and we can deal with it ». And at the moment, I don’t see that happening. So until that changes, Yes, this kind of binding of particular things will continue.
M.K. : In your book, « The World According to Xi », you say China used to be more « discreet » under Hu Jintao. How has that changed under Xi Jinping ? What have been Xi’s diplomatic innovations since his rise to power ?
K.B. : First of all, I think that China has become much more confident in the way it speaks to the world as its economy has grown strongly and has become more stable. Hu Jintao came to power when China had just joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Chinese economy quadrupled in size during his ten years as party chairman. Naturally, a leader will not behave in the same way when his country has a quarter of the economic weight it has today. So Xi Jinping has basically seized the opportunities made possible by China’s new economic weight and allowed himself a more ambitious, more expressive stance. As a result, the tone of Chinese diplomacy under Xi Jinping has gone up a notch.
But another thing that Xi Jinping did, and quite well, was to better coordinate domestic policy making and create a more unified message within the CCP. Unity around projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) illustrates this. It’s as if China is saying « This is what a world where we are a major player looks like ». Another element, perhaps catalysed by the pandemic, is that China is starting to talk more like a power that thinks the United States will eventually disappear. China obviously doesn’t want America to collapse or disappear. But beyond that, it could live well with an America that is less in its face. And this is a very recent change.
T.G-P : Does China really have hegemonic ambitions? Would you say that China is proposing an alternative rather than an additional model to the existing liberal order?
K.B : I have the impression that if a Chinese hegemony were to emerge, it would not be planned. Rather, it would be caused by the behavior of other nations that would somehow make China resign itself to becoming a hegemonic power. It doesn’t want that because it doesn’t want to assume the responsibilities of a superpower, have “client states” that take its money, or have to act as a “world police”. For these reasons, I don’t think that China has ambitions for global hegemony. Rather, I think it wants a world that works better for it, and it has this very distinct idea of particular areas where it wants more. The Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) represent that and are driven by the idea of some kind of Chinese multilateralism. But I don’t think they have desires of global domination. China doesn’t want the responsibilities that go with it ; above all, China is very self-interested power.
T.G-P: You mentioned the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Do you think that China wants to compete with the Bretton Woods institutions, such as the World Bank or the IMF?
K.B : I think that China wants above all to develop alternatives that are more appropriate to its model, without actively promoting them. I don’t think it wants the current global system to disappear because it would be too costly to replace it. And I also don’t think it wants to be in that situation. China knows its message is too difficult to convey because of its “exceptional” character. Be it its political system, its cultural background or its behavior [on the international scene]. It seems to understand the need for a bipolar world where it can get what it wants without providing what it does not want to provide.
M.K : We understand through your book that Chinese foreign policy is very pragmatic and is essentially based on the defence of its economic interests. Do ideological considerations play a determining role in Xi Jinping’s foreign policy? Is the perception of an unjust international system still a factor that guides Chinese foreign policy today ?
I don’t think ideology is still as important to them. As I said, I don’t think there is an attempt to export Marxism-Leninism with Chinese characteristics. The ideology of the CCP is much more nationalist than it is communist. For them, the ideology makes sense in foreign policy in that it gives them a raison d’être and justification for doing what it takes to make China a great power. They see this as a historical necessity. Marxism-Leninism serves more as some sort of compass to point the way forward. They believe that there is a scientific inevitability for China to become a great power. Now, is it because of that sense of injustice that you mentioned ? Well, it certainly plays a role in the moral narrative of the CCP. The Chinese and the Party believe that China’s rebirth, its resurrection and global restoration is morally justified because of the way the Chinese people and nation have suffered in modern history after the mid-19th century and the Opium Wars. This narrative is therefore moral as well as historical.
T.G-P: What is your view on the case of Meng Wanghzou [the CFO of Huawei, arrested in 2018 in Canada at the request of the United States] ? Do you think this kind of diplomatic incident can happen again ?
K.B : It was indeed a huge diplomatic problem. As you know, relations between Canada and China have always been delicate. Since the 1970s, under Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, and even under Stephen Harper, relations have always been difficult. So it’s not that surprising that this has happened, and I can’t imagine that this will be the incident of its kind. In the near future, I also don’t think it will be just a Canadian issue. There are likely to be other incidents of this kind between China and other countries, in which the same method of reciprocal abduction of nationals could be used. In my view, this is very problematic and the creation of such precedents does not bode well. It is, however, a practice that has its origins in the 1960s, so there is nothing very surprising here…
To go deeper :
Brown, Kerry. 2018. The World According to Xi : Everything You Need to Know About the New China. London New York: I.B. Tauris.
Brown, Kerry. 2020. China. London: Polity Histories.
Courmont, Barthélémy, et Éric Mottet. 2013. « Entre multilatéralisme et nouvel hégémon: la multipolarité à la chinoise » dans Repenser la multipolarité. Géopolitique. Montréal: Septentrion.
Mahbubani, Kishore. 2020. Has China Won?: The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy. Singapore: Public Affairs.
Economy, Elizabeth C. 2018. The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State. New York, NY: OUP USA.
Hanlon, Robert J. 2017. « Thinking about the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Can a China-Led Development Bank Improve Sustainability in Asia? » Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 4 (3): 541‑54. https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.186.
Foreign Policy. 2020. « Trump Is Beijing’s Best Asset : Chinese officials want the U.S. president reelected — because he’s so weak. », 15 octobre 2019. Sect. Argument.https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/15/china-trump-trump2020-deal-beijing-best-asset/
Morozov, Evgeny. 2020. « Bataille géopolitique autour de la 5G ». Le Monde diplomatique. 1er octobre 2020. https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2020/10/MOROZOV/62292.
The Washington Post. 2020. « Opinion | Trump and Pompeo have overseen the degradation of the State Department », 15 août 2020, sect. The Post’s View. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trump-and-pompeo-have-overseen-the-degradation-of-the-state-department/2020/08/14/7aaa1bca-d34e-11ea-9038-af089b63ac21_story.html.
